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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996).
ISSUES
There are three issues before the Court:
I.

Did the district court err in holding that Utah Code

Annotated Section 70A-9-318(3), as interpreted by the Utah
Supreme Court in America First Credit Union v. First Sec. Bank,
930 P.2d 1198 (Utah 1997), does not apply to this case?1

Because

this is a legal issue, the standard of review is de novo, and
this Court reviews the decision of the district court for
correctness.

Kennecott Copper Co. v. Salt Lake County, 799 P.2d

1156 (Utah 1990).
II.

Did the district court err in holding that Utah Code

Annotated Section 70A-9-318(2) does not entitle First Security to
judgment in its favor.2
of review is de novo.

This is a legal issue, and the standard
Id.

III. Did the district court err in awarding attorney's fees
to 4447 Associates when the dispute between the parties did not
"arise under" the original contract but centered around whether

x

This issue was raised in First Security's Motion for Entry
of Judgment in Favor of First Security, R. 2245-62.
2

This issue was raised in First Security's Memorandum in
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 187178.
1

First Security had received notice of an assignment of the
contract?3

The standard of review is de novo.

Id.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS
This case is governed by Utah Code Annotated Section 7 0A-9318 (1990), which provides:
(1) Unless an account debtor has made an enforceable
agreement not to assert defenses or claims arising out of a
sale as provided in Section 70A-9-206 the rights of an
assignee are subject to:
(a) all the terms of the contract between the
account debtor and assignor and any defense or claim
arising therefrom; and
(b) any other defense or claim of the
account debtor against the assignor which accrues
before the account debtor receives notification of
the assignment.
(2) So far as the right to payment or a part thereof
under an assigned contract has not been fully earned by
performance, and notwithstanding notification of the
assignment, any modification of or substitution for the
contract made in good faith and in accordance with
reasonable commercial standards is effective against an
assignee unless the account debtor has otherwise agreed but
the assignee acguires corresponding rights under the
modified or substituted contract. The assignment may
provide that such modification or substitution is a breach
by the assignor.
(3) The account debtor is authorized to pay the
assignor until the account debtor receives notification that
the amount due or to become due has been assigned and that
payment is to be made to the assignee. A notification which
does not reasonably identify the rights assigned is
ineffective. If requested by the account debtor, the
assignee must seasonably furnish reasonable proof that the
assignment has been made and unless he does so the account
debtor may pay the assignor.
3

This issue was originally raised in First Security's
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment, R. 1883-85.
2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings.
This appeal involves a dispute between 4447 Associates and
First Security Financial ("First Security") over whether First
Security received proper notice that its debt to its original
creditor had been assigned and that First Security should make
payments to the assignee.
After trial, the district court held that the required
notice had not been given and that First Security was therefore
free to satisfy its debt through an agreement with th£ original
creditor.

R. 781.

The district court entered judgment in favor

of First Security, R. 783-84, and 4447 Associates appealed, R.
789-90.

This Court reversed and held that notice of the

assignment had been given.

889 P.2d 467.

remanded to the district court.

Id.

The case was then

Before the district court

entered judgment in the case, the Utah Supreme Court issued its
decision in America First.

First Security then moved for

judgment in its favor based upon the America First decision.
2245-46.

R.

First Security also argued on remand that it was

allowed to modify the contract with Capitol pursuant to section
318(2).

R. 1871-78.

The district court denied First Security's

motion, R. 2351-56, and entered judgment in favor of 4447
Associates, R. 2357-59.
notice of appeal.

First Security then filed a timely

R. 2369-70.

3

Statement of Facts,
1.

In 1982 First Security and Capitol Thrift & Loan Company

("Capitol") entered into an Asset Purchase Agreement whereby
First Security acquired certain assets from Capitol &nd became
obligated to make certain payments to Capitol.
2.
Capitol.

R. 776.

Disputes subsequently arose between First Security and
On July 10, 1985, the parties entered into a Settlement

Agreement whereby Capitol settled its disputes with First
Security and cancelled First Security's debt to Capitol under the
Asset Purchase Agreement.
3.

R. 780.

Prior to settling with First Security, Capitol had

assigned to Zions First National Bank ("Zions") its interest in
the Asset Purchase Agreement as collateral for a loan that
Capitol obtained from Zions.
4.

R. 777.

Zions, as assignee, filed suit against First Security to

collect the debt that had been cancelled by Capitol.
5.

R. 2-39.

In June 1990, after filing suit, Zions assigned its

interest in the Asset Purchase Agreement to the appellee, 4447
Associates.
6.

R. 780.

At trial before the Third District Court, the court held

that 4447 Associates "failed to prove that First Security
received sufficient notice of the assignment, as required by
law," to preclude First Security from satisfying its debt with
the original creditor, Capitol.

R. 709.

4

7.

4447 Associates then filed an appeal, which was heard by

this Court.

889 P.2d 467.

The issue on that appeal was whether

the district court had correctly determined that First Security
did not receive adequate notice of the assignment frton Capitol to
Zions.

Id, at 470.

First Security argued that under section

70A-9-318(3), First Security had to receive notice of two things:
(a) notice of the fact of the assignment, and (b) notice that
First Security should make payments to Zions rather than Capitol.
Id. at 472 n.8.
8.

The court of appeals determined that First Security had

received notice of the assignment through a footnote in a
financial statement received by First Security.

Id. at 474.

The

court of appeals also held that while First Security "clearly11
had not received the dual notice required by section 318(3), id.
at 470 n.5, as a legal matter, section 318(3) did not apply to
its analysis.

Id. at 472 n.8.

The court of appeals reversed and

remanded this case to the district court.
9.

First Security then filed a petition for certiorari with

the Utah Supreme Court seeking review of the decision of the
court of appeals.

The petition was denied without comment by the

Utah Supreme Court.
10.

899 P.2d 1231.

However, the supreme court granted a petition for

certiorari in the similar case of America First Credit Union v.
First Security Bank.

910 P.2d 425 (Utah 1995).

5

First Security's

petition in America First specifically referred to this case and
urged the supreme court to resolve the issue in both cases
concerning the proper application of the dual notice requirement
in section 70A-9-318(3).
11.

R. 2008.

While this case was on remand to the district court,

and before judgment was entered, the Utah Supreme Court issued
its decision in the America First case.
1997).

930 P.2d 1198 (Utah

Based upon that decision, First Security moved for

judgment in its favor.

R. 2245-46.

First Security argued that

the district court was obligated to follow the law as announced
by the supreme court in America First, which implicitly overruled
portions of the decision of the court of appeals in this case.
R. 2252-55.
12.

The district court disagreed with 4447 Associates'

argument that res judicata and law of the case prevented the
district court from considerirg the America First decision.
court held:

The

"The Court has the authority to consider and apply

the Utah Supreme Court's decision in America First Credit Union
v. First Security Bank of Utah."

R. 2355.

However, the district

court ruled against First Security on the merits and entered

6

judgment in favor of 4447 Associates.4
attorney's fees to 4447 Associates.
13.

The court also awarded

R. 2357-58.

First Security then filed a timely notice of appeal

from the judgment entered in favor of 4447 Associated.

R. 2369-

70.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

On remand the district court was required to apply the

law as announced by the highest appellate court in the state.

In

America First, the Utah Supreme Court held that, even in cases
where an account debt is fully satisfied, section 70A-9-318(3)
requires notice not only that the account has been assigned but
also that the debtor should make payments to the assignee.
Because there is no dispute that the dual notice requirement of
section 70A-9-318 was not satisfied in this case, the district
court erred by not entering judgment in favor of First Security.
II.

Section 318(2) provides that parties may modify

executory contracts even when notice of an assignment has been
provided.

There is no dispute that the contract in this case was

executory because a number of quarterly interest payments
remained due.

The district court therefore erred in holding that

First Security was not entitled to judgment in its favor.
4

The district court held: "Utah Code Annotated Section 70A9-318(3) does not apply to this action pursuant to the decision
of the Utah Court of Appeals." R. 2354. The district court did
not state whether it believed that America First overruled the
decision of the court of appeals. R. 2 3 58.
7

III. In addition, the district court erred in awarding
attorney's fees to 4447 Associates.

The Asset Purchase Agreement

between First Security and Capitol allows attorney's fees only
for disputes "arising under" the Asset Purchase Agreement.

The

dispute between First Security and 4447 Associates did not
involve any provision of the Asset Purchase Agreement or arise
under it in any way.

Rather, the dispute turned solely on

whether First Security had received notice of an assignment of
the Asset Purchase Agreement.

This dispute is extraneous to the

Asset Purchase Agreement and not contemplated by it.

Therefore

the district court erred in awarding attorney's fees to 4447
Associates.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED ON REMAND BY HOLDING THAT SECTION
70A-9-318(3) DOES NOT APPLY TO THIS CASE.
As an account debtor whose account obligation was assigned

to a third party, First Security's rights and duties are governed
by section 70A-9-318(3) of the Utah Code.

That section provides:

(3) The account debtor is authorized to pay the
assignor until the account debtor receives notification that
the amount due or to become due has been assigned and that
payment is to be made to the assignee. A notification which
does not reasonably identify the rights assigned is
ineffective. If requested by the account debtor, the
assignee must seasonably furnish reasonable proof that the
assignment has been made and unless he does so the account
debtor may pay the assignor.
(Emphasis added.)

8

When this case was before this Court on the first appeal,
this Court ruled that, as a matter of law, section 318(3) did not
apply to its analysis, stating:
The two-pronged notice requirement mandated by Utah Code
Ann. § 7GA-9-318(3) (1990) is not applicable to our
analvsis. Section 9-318(3) sets forth the notice
requirements for an assignee to receive payments directly
from the account debtor. In the instant case, the question
of whether Zions was entitled to receive payments from First
Security as they became due does not merit consideration.
889 P.2d at 472 n.8 (emphasis added).

This Court apparently

believed that the dual notice requirement of section 318(3)
applies only to "payments as they become due" and not a payment
in full like the settlement in this case.

Id.

However, as shown

below, the Utah Supreme Court reached a contrary conclusion in
America First.
As noted by the supreme court, section 70A-9-318(3) clearly
requires notice not only of the fact of the assignment but also
that the account debtor must pay the assignee.

The burden is on

the assignee to provide clear and adequate notice.

This

requirement is supported by the same policy considerations set
forth in the supreme court's earlier decision in Time Finance
Corp. v. Johnson Trucking Co., 458 P.2d 873 (Utah 1969):
"The fact, however, of such substitution of a new creditor
must, in order to make the debtor liable to the assignee, be
brought home to the debtor with much exactness and certainty
before he has paid the debt. The rule of notice to him is
much more stringent than that which may defeat the title of
a purchaser of a chose in action or of real estate. The
latter is free to purchase or refuse to purchase as he
chooses, and therefore it is his duty, before acting to
9

trace out any reasonable doubt and to inform himself of the
true facts as soon as anything arises to put him on inquiry.
But the debtor is not so situated. He must pay to his
original creditor when the debt is due unless he can
establish affirmatively that someone else has a better
right. The notice to him therefore must be of so exact and
specific a character as to convince him that he' is no longer
liable to such original creditor."
Id. at 876-77.
Section 318(3) protects consumers and other account debtors
by allowing them to deal directly with their creditors in
resolving disputes, notwithstanding the common practice of
assigning accounts to remote lenders as collateral for accounts
and inventory financing.

A typical example of such a case is as

follows:
John Smith purchased a car from Uptown Used Cars and
arranged for financing at the dealership. At the time of
the purchase, John received written notice that Uptown Used
Cars assigns its accounts to Friendly Finance. The notice
did not indicate that John should make payments to Friendly
Finance.
A few months later, John decided to sell his car to his
neighbor and called Uptown Used Cars for the payoff amount.
Uptown Used Cars provided this information, and John sent a
check to Uptown for the entire amount.
Thereafter, Uptown Used Cars went out of business
without paying Friendly Finance. Friendly Finance then sued
John for the full payoff amount, arguing that John knew that
the account had been assigned and was therefore prohibited
from paying the account in full to Uptown Used Cars.
Friendly Finance acknowledged that John was authorized to
make his regular monthly payments to Uptown Used Cars as
they became due, but it asserted that the notice of
assignment prohibited John from paying the account in full
to Uptown Used Cars without the permission of Friendly
Finance.
Under the prior ruling of this Court, John would have no
protection under section 318(3) because he did not make "payments
10

as they became due" to Uptown Used Cars but instead resolved the
debt in its entirety despite knowledge of the assignment.
However, the supreme court correctly recognized in America First
that the protections of section 318(3) are not so narrow and that
the words "as they become due" should not be inserted into
section 318 (3).
In America First, America First Credit Union ("America
First") made three loans to a food service company called
Renaissance,

930 P.2d at 1200, As security for these loans,

Renaissance assigned to America First a savings certificate it
had with First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. ("First Security").
Id.

First Security was given notice of the assignment and acted

on this assignment by placing a "flag" or "block" on the account
in its computer system.

Id.

-

When its savings certificate expired, Renaissance
represented to First Security that the assignment to America
First had been released.

Id.

First Security then paid

Renaissance the entire amount of the certificate.

Id.

America

First later sued First Security for payment of the certificate.
Id.

The trial court held that First Security had recognized both

that there had been an assignment and

n/

that payment should be

made to America First'" and had flagged its computer system
accordingly.

Id. at 1201. Therefore, the district court entered

judgment in favor of America First.

11

Id.

First Security

appealed.

Id.

The court of appeals concluded that "First

Security had not shown the factual findings of the trial court to
be clearly erroneous."
certiorari.

Id.

The supreme court then granted

Id.

In its decision, the supreme court emphasized certain
portions of section 318(3) as follows:
The account debtor is authorized to pay the assignor until
the account debtor receives notification that the amount due
or to become due has been assigned and that payment is to be
made to the assignee.
Id. (emphasis added by supreme court).

The court then stated:

This statute imposes a two-pronged notice requirement.
First, notice of the assignment must be given. Second, the
notice must state that payments are to be made to the
assignee.
Id.

While the credit union in America First argued—similar to

the reasoning in this Court's prior opinion—that the second
prong of section 318(3) "is tailored to 'indirect collection'
situations and therefore does not apply," the supreme court
rejected this interpretation and applied both prongs of section
318(3) even though there had been a full payment.5

Id.

In doing

so, it made clear that section 318(3) is not limited to cases

5

Under the facts of America First, the supreme court
ultimately found that "First Security received notice of the
assignment and that payment was to be made to [America First1 as
required by Utah Code Ann. S 70A-9-318(3)." Id. at 1201-1202
(emphasis added). Thus, the supreme court found that the second
prong of section 318(3) was satisfied.
12

involving the assignment of payments "as they become due," as
held by this Court in its prior opinion.
The decision of the supreme court in America First is in
accordance with the decisions of other jurisdictions'" that have
decided v/hether section 318(3) applies only to "payments as they
become due" or also to cases where debts are paid in full or
extinguished.

In Frankford Trust Co. v. Stainless Steel Servs..

Inc., the defendant, Stainless Steel Services, entered into a
lease agreement for certain equipment,
Super. Ct. 1984).
original lessor.

475 A.2d 14 7, 149 (Pa.

Disputes arose between the defendant and the
The parties agreed to abrogate the lease, and

the original lessor released Stainless from its duties
thereunder.

However, the lease had already been assigned to

Frankford Trust Co.

The court was therefore faced with the very

question that exists in this case:

May a party settle an

obligation with its original creditor if it has not received the
dual notice required by section 318(3)?

In ruling on this

question the court held:
Among the defenses to the entry of judgment asserted by
Stainless is the argument that the original parties had
agreed to abrogate the lease agreement and to release
Stainless from its duties thereunder. Such discharge of
contractual obligation if agreed to by both Stainless and
Commercial before notice of assignment, would establish a
binding and meritorious defense against Frankford's claim as
assignee. Under the Pennsylvania Uniform Commercial Code
and as a settled principle of contract law an "assignor
[Commercial! retains his power to discharge or modify the
duty of the obligor [Stainless] . . . [until] the obligor
receives notification that the right has been assigned and
13

that performance is to be rendered to the assignee
[Frankford]."
Id. at 150 (brackets and ellipses in original; emphasis added).
Likewise, the court held in First Fidelity Bank v. Matthews
that the original parties to an agreement were entitled to
"terminate11 the agreement where the dual notice required by
section 318(3) had not been provided.
1984).

692 P.2d 1255, 1260 (Mont.

In addition, the Ninth Circuit has held that

participation in a settlement "constituted 'payment'" for
purposes of section 318.

Cumming v. Johnson, 616 F.2d 1069, 1073

(9th Cir. 1979).

The Court of Appeals of Arizona reached the

same conclusion:

"Where one purports to pay an obligation prior

to the time he is obligated to pay it, and the obligee receives
his tender for the purpose of extinguishing all or part of debt,
then there is , payment. ,n
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1977).

Corbett v. Corbett, 569 P.2d 292, 294

See also First Finance Co. v. Akathiotis,

249 N.E.2d 663, 665 (111. Ct. App. 1969) ("Defendant paid the
full contract price to his seller as he was authorized to do
under section 9-318 of the Code, absent notice by the assignee of
the assignment and demand that payments be made to the
assignee").
The cases cited above support the decision of the Utah
Supreme Court in America First and demonstrate that First
Security was entitled to settle its obligation with its original

14

creditor, Capitol, until it received notice that it was to pay
Zions.6
Because the second prong of section 318(3) applies as a
matter of law to cases involving the full payment of an
obligation, the only remaining issue in this case is the factual
question of whether First Security ever received notice that it
was to pay Zions.

This factual issue has been conclusively

decided by both this Court and the district court.

This Court

stated in its prior opinion:
The parties also debate the question of whether First
Security ever received, beyond mere notice of the
assignment, notice to make payment directly to Zions as
contemplated in Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-318(3) (1990). It
clearly did not, and we decline to address the issue
further.
889 P.2d 467, 470 n.5 (emphasis added).

Because the dual notice

required by the Utah Code was "clearly11 not provided, the
district court erred in not granting judgment in favor of First
Security.

6

The district court was bound to follow the law as announced
by the Utah Supreme Court in America First. In Petty v. Clark,
192 P.2d 589 (Utah 1948), the Utah Supreme Court held that where
an intermediate appellate court announces a rule and remands a
case, but in the meantime the highest appellate court has reached
a contrary conclusion, the lower court "is bound by the decision
of the highest court of appeals." Id. at 594.
15

II.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT FIRST SECURITY AND
CAPITOL WERE NOT ENTITLED TO MODIFY THEIR CONTRACT PURSUANT
TO SECTION 70A-3-318(2) NOTWITHSTANDING NOTICE OF THE
ASSIGNMENT.
As a matter of law, First Security and Capitol were free to

modify or substitute the terms of their original contract.

Utah

law provides in section 70A-9-318(2):
(2) So far as the right to payment or a part thereof
under an assigned contract has not been fully earned by
performance, and notwithstanding notification of the
assignment, any modification of or substitution for the
contract made in good faith and in accordance with
reasonable commercial standards is effective against an
assignee unless the account debtor has otherwise agreed
but the assignee acquires corresponding rights under
the modified or substituted contract. The assignment
may provide that such modification or substitution is a
breach by the assignor.
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-318(2) (1990) (emphasis added).
This section makes clear that if a contract is executory7,
the original parties to the contract may modify or substitute the
contract in good faith and in accordance with reasonable
commercial standards.

Such modification is effective against an

assignee "notwithstanding notification of the assignment."

Id.

(emphasis added).
The official comment to subsection 9-318(2) states:

7

A contract that is executory is one in which something
remains to be done by one or more of the parties. Martin v. John
Clay & Co., 167 S.W.2d 407, 411 (Mo. Ct. App. 1943) (quoted by
Levitz v. Warrington, 877 P.2d 1245 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)
(Dissent)). The Asset Purchase Agreement in this case was
executory because the value of the assets and the price had not
yet been determined as outlined in the contract.
16

Prior law was in confusion as to whether modification
of an executory contract by account debtor and assignor
without the assignee's consent was possible after
notification of an assignment. Subsection (2) makes
good faith modifications by assignor and account debtor
without the assignee's consent effective against the
assignee even after notification. This rule may do
some violence to accepted doctrines of contract law.
Nevertheless it is a sound and indeed a necessary rule
in view of the realities of large scale procurement.
As made clear by this comment, First Security and Capitol
were free to modify or substitute their contract, and any
assignee, such as Zions or 4447 Associates, is bound by those
modifications or substitutions.

In the case of Bank One, Texas

v. Communication Specialists, 813 S.W.2d 755 (Tex. Ct. App.
1991), a dispute apparently arose between the original parties to
a contract.

An amount of $47,780 was originally due on the

contract, and the contract was assigned to a third party.

The

parties to the contract thereafter modified their agreement and
reduced the account receivable to $24,206.61.

Id. at 758.

The

court held that, notwithstanding notification, the adjustment was
binding on the assignee.

The court held that an assignee was

entitled only to the rights that
modification."

the assignor "possessed after

Id.

In this case, as in Bank One,

Capitol and First Security

had a dispute about how much, if anything, was owed on the Asset
Purchase Agreement.

The original parties modified their original

agreement through the means of a Settlement Agreement.
Notwithstanding the prior assignment of the Asset Purchase
17

Agreement to Zions, and subsequent reassignment to 4447
Associates, the modification of the original agreement was
binding on both assignees.

4447 Associates possessed only the

rights that Capitol possessed after modification.8
Because section 9-318(2) allows the original parties to the
contract to modify the contract, the parties can clearly enter
into a settlement agreement concerning the contract.

One

commentator writes:
Does the right to modify the assigned contract include
the right to terminate it altogether? If both Seller
and Buyer agree that the widget supply contract should
end prematurely, this can happen without the consent of
Bank, although such termination might constitute
default under the assignment. Official Comment 2 to
UCC § 9-318 certainly suggests that modification
includes termination. Article 9 itself draws no
distinction between a reduction in supply of widgets by
20 percent and total abandonment of the supply
contract; in both cases, the key is honesty and
commercial reasonableness.
B. Clark, The Law of Secured Transactions Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, § 11.04[2] (1993).

There was no evidence at

trial that the Settlement Agreement was not entered into in good
faith or was not commercially reasonable.

Accordingly, the

contract was properly modified and, notwithstanding the fact that
this Court held that notice had been received, the district court
erred in entering judgment against First Security.

8

Under section 318(2), 4447 Associates may still have a
cause of action against Capitol for modifying the Asset Purchase
Agreement.
18

III. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES TO 4447
ASSOCIATES.
The Utah Supreme Court has held that "the award of attorney
fees is allowed only in accordance with the terms of the
contract."
1988) .

Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah

The only contract in this case is the Asset Purchase

Agreement between First Security and Capitol.9

That contract

states:
In the event of a dispute among the parties arising
under this Agreement, the party or parties prevailing
in such dispute shall be entitled to collect their
costs from the other parties, including without
limitation court costs and reasonable attorney's fees.
(Emphasis added.)
The dispute between First Security and 4447 Associates did
not "arise under" the Asset Purchase Agreement but revolved
around whether First Security had received notice of a subsequent
assignment of the Asset Purchase Agreement.
not a party to this subsequent assignment.

First Security was
Nor was the

assignment contemplated in the Asset Purchase Agreement.
If there had been a dispute between First Security and 4447
Associates regarding the proper interpretation of some provision
of the Asset Purchase Agreement, then 4447 Associates, as the
assignee of Capitol's assignee, would have been entitled to
recover any attorney's fees that Capitol would have been entitled
9

There is no contract between First Security and 4447
Associates.
19

to receive.

However, the dispute between 4447 Associates and

First Security for which the trial court awarded attorney's fees
did not relate to the Asset Purchase Agreement but to a
subsequent agreement between Capitol and Zions and a' later
subsequent agreement between Zions and 4447 Associates.

The

question before the trial court related solely to whether notice
of the assignment was given.
the Asset Purchase Agreement.

That dispute did not "arise under"
Thus, the district court erred in

awarding attorney's fees to 4447 Associates.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the
judgment entered in favor of 4447 Associates and remand the case
for judgment in favor of First Security.
DATED this

£>

day of June, 1998.
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
/

Scott H. Clar)
James S. Jardine
Brent D. Wride
Attorneys for Defendant and
Appellant, First Security
Financial
0280755.02
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DATED this

g*

£>

day of June, 1998.
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S(
James S. Jardine
Brent D. Wride
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Financial
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Key Bank Tower, Suite 850
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Telephone: (801) 538-2424
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THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
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SALT LAKE COUNTY
BYDI
BY
DEPUTY CLERK
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Attorneys for Plaintiff 4447 A:ssociates

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK,
a National Banking Association
and 4447 ASSOCIATES, a Utah
general partnership,
Plaintiff,

)
)
)
;I

ORDER CONCERNING DEFENDANT'S
DEFENSES TO JUDGMENT

;

v.
FIRST SECURITY FINANCIAL,
a National corporation

v
]
]
)

Case No. 870901578CN
Judge Frank G. Noel

Defendant.
Based

upon

the

Findings

of

Fact

and

Conclusions

ot

Law

Concerning Defendant's Defenses to Judgment, the Court's previous
orders and the entire record in this action,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1.

Defendant's defenses relating to Section 70A-9-318 are

hereby DENIED.
2.

Defendant's defenses which allegedly accrued prior to

receipt of the notice of assignment are DENIED.
3.

Defendant's motion for entry of judgment in favor of

defendant is DENIED.

rm

4.

All other defenses to judgment in favor of plaintiff

which are raised or asserted by defendant, are hereby DENIED.
5.

Pursuant to the Court's Order Denying Defendant's Motion

for Stayf the Court again DENIES defendant's request that this
Court refrain from entering judgment.
Defendant's defenses relating to the award o£ attorney

6.

fees and costs in favor of plaintiff are DENIED.
7.

Pursuant

to the Court's

February

29, 1996 Order

on

Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendant's Motion for
Stay, judgment should enter in favor of Plaintiff 4447 Associates
against

Defendant

First

Security

$282f741.52 as of March 27, 1997.

Financial

in

the

amount

of

From and after March 27, 1997,

interest shall accrue thereon at the per diem rate of $33.51 in
favor of Plaintiff 4447 Associates and against Defendant First
Security.
8.

Judgment

should

enter

in

favor

of

plaintiff

4447

Associates against defendant First Security Financial in the amount
of $82,240.12 for attorney fees and costs incurred as of March 17,
1997.

From and after the date of entry of judgment, interest shall

accrue at the per diem rate of $22.53 in favor of Plaintiff 4447
Associates and against Defendant First. Security.
DATED this

/

day o f ^ p r T T ^ 19
BY TH

FRANK
DISTRICT
2

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER

James S. Jardine
Scott H. Clark
Brent D. Wride
DURHAM, EVANS, JONES & PINEGAR

(m»km
affrey M. Jones
Jy Mark Gibb

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing to be hand-delivered this

AN

day of Ap^rtTf 1997, to

the following:
James S. Jardine
Brent D. Wride
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
79 South Main Street
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385
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FILED DISTRICT COURT
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

Jeffrey M. Jones, Esq. (1741)
J. Mark Gibb, Esq. (5702)
DURHAM, EVANS, JONES & PINEGAR
Key Bank Tower, Suite 850
50 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Telephone: (801) 538-2424

JUL

1 1997

SALT LAKE dk/WTY.^
BY DEPUTY
:PUTY CLERK
CLERK

* <*£V <yXhi4^

Attorneys for Plaintiff 4447 Associates

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK,
a National Banking Association
and 4447 ASSOCIATES, a Utah
general partnership,
Plaintiff,

]
]1
)1
|

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW CONCERNING DEFENDANT'S
DEFENSES TO JUDGMENT

;

v.
l

Case No. 870901578CN

(
]

Judge Frank G. Noel

FIRST SECURITY FINANCIAL,
a National corporation
Defendant.

This matter is before the Court on First Security Financial's
claims of defenses to entry of judgment argued by defendant after
remand to this Court. Pursuant to the Court's Order on Plaintiff's
Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendant's Motion for Stay, the
parties filed extensive memoranda and presented argument on October
3, 1996 and March 20, 1997 (the "Hearings") regarding all remaining
issues.

Plaintiff 4447 Associates was represented by Jeffrey M.

Jones and J. Mark Gibb of Durham, Evans, Jones & Pinegar; Defendant
First Security Financial was represented by James S. Jardine and
Brent D. Wride of Ray, Quinney & Nebeker.

Pursuant to Rule 52,

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and based upon a review of the
evidence presented at trial in this matter and reargued upon
remand, the memoranda filed by both parties, the stipulations of
counsel regarding the reasonableness of each party's respective
attorney fees and costs and the arguments of counsel at the
Hearings, the Court is now fully informed and enters the following
findings of fact and conclusions of law:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

There is insufficient evidence in the record to support

defendant's defenses to entry of judgment in favor of plaintiff.
The inferences which defendant requests the Court to draw from the
ambiguous evidence admitted at trial and now argued by defendant
are insufficient to establish defendant's defenses. Specifically:
a.

Defendant's

defenses

regarding

its

breach

of

warranty defenses and claims against Capitol Thrift and Richard
Christenson are not supported by the evidence in the record.
b.

Defendant's defenses pursuant to Utah Code Annotated

Section 70A-9-318, are not supported by the decision of the Court
of Appeals and are not supported by the evidence in the record.
c.

Defendant's remaining defenses whereby it alleges

that it is not obligated to pay plaintiff the payments owea under
the Asset Purchase Agreement are likewise not supported by the
evidence in the record.
2.

Prior to hearing argument on attorney fees and costs, the

parties stipulated that plaintiff incurred reasonable attorney fees
and costs through February 28, 1997 in its prosecution of this
2

ni&',

action in the amount of $103,358.40 and that defendant incurred
reasonable attorney fees and costs in defense of this action in the
amount of $107,824.60.

The parties further stipulated that if

plaintiff were entitled to attorney fees and costs the amount of
attorney fees and costs awarded to plaintiff should be reduced in
an amount equal to 10% of the total fees and costs of plaintiff for
fees and costs incurred regarding defendant's motion for partial
summary judgment and in an amount equal to 10% of the total
attorney fees and costs of defendant for fees incurred ih bringing
the motion for partial summary judgment. The parties agreed not to
challenge their respective attorney fees and costs except as to
entitlement under the Asset Purchase Agreement.
3.

The Court

finds the parties' stipulation

regarding

attorney fees and costs to be reasonable under applicable Utah law.
Specifically, plaintiff incurred reasonable attorney fees and costs
through February 28, 1997 in its prosecution of this action in the
amount of $103,358.40

and that defendant

incurred reasonable

attorney fees and costs in defense of this action in the amount of
$107,824.60.

Further, it is reasonable that attorney fees and

costs the amount of attorney fees and costs awarded to plaintiff
should be reduced in an amount equal to 10% of the total fees and
costs

of

plaintiff

for

fees

and

costs

incurred

regarding

defendant's motion for partial summary judgment and in an amount
equal to 10% of the total attorney fees and costs of defendant for
fees and costs incurred in bringing the motion for partial summary
judgment.
o

4.

The Court further finds pursuant to the stipulation of

the parties that the work described in the affidavits of counsel
for plaintiff were actually performed, that the work performed was
reasonably necessary to adequately prosecute the matter, and that
the attorneys' and other paralegal's billing rates were consistent
with the rates customarily charged in the locality for similar
services. The Court has further considered all other circumstances
which require consideration of additional factors pursuant to Utah
law,

including

those

listed

in

the

Code

of

Professional

Responsibility, and finds that fees and costs of $82,240.12 were
reasonably and necessarily incurred by plaintiff in enforcing the
terms of the Asset Purchase Agreement.

These fees and costs

incurred are awardable as they were incurred and arose under
paragraph 22 of the Asset Purchase Agreement.
5.

Accordingly, the Court finds that plaintiff is entitled

to an award of fees and costs of $82,240.12.
6.

Each finding of fact which may be construed to be a

conclusion of law shall be so construed.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Utah Code Annotated Section 70A~9-318(3) does not apply

to this action pursuant to the decision of the Utah Court of
Appeals.
2.

Utah Code Annotated Section 70A-9-318(l) does apply to

this action pursuant to the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals.
3.

Pursuant to the Court's Order on Plaintiff's Motion for

Summary Judgment and Defendant's Motion for Stay, the terms of the
4

Asset Purchase Agreement and applicable Utah law including Dixie
State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d

985

(Utah 1988), plaintiff is

entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs incurred.
4.

The Court has the authority to consider and apply the

Utah Supreme Court's decision in America First Credit Union v.
First Security Bank of Utah, No. 950274 (Utah January 21, 1997);
however, the America First decision is not applicable to this
action as the Court's decision interprets Utah Code Annotated
Section 70A-9-318(3), not Section 70A-9-318(1).
5.

Each conclusion of law which may be construed to be a

finding of fact shall be so construed.
DATED this

/

day of^Apr±l)v 199'
BY THE Ci

FRANK G
DISTRICT
APPROVED AS TO FORM:
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER

James S. Jardine
Scott H. Clark
Brent D. Wride
DURHAM, EVANS, JONES & PINEGAR

at

: f r e y M. J o n e s
'J/. Mark Gibb

lift.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing to be hand-delivered this

A

the following:
James S. Jardine
Brent D. Wride
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
79 South Main Street
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385
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Exhibit C

ASSET PURCHASE AGREEMENT
THIS AGREEMENT i s made and e n t e r e d i n t o t h i s Jj^ day
of
\~1~^-<J -\^-~^<*\
, 1982/ by and between First Security
Financial, a Utan corporation (*?S Financial"); Capitol Thrift and
Loan Company, a Utah corporation ("Capitol") ; Richard A.
Christenson, an individual ("Christenson") ; and Bruce L. Moesser,
an individual ("Moesser")•
RECITALS

:

A. Capitol is an operating industrial loan corporation
under the laws of the State of Utah.
B.

Christenson is the majority stockholder of Capitol.

C. Christenson and Moesser are the president and
executive vice president of Capitol, respectively.
D. FS Financial' is a newly organized industrial loan
corporation under 'the laws -of the State of Utah.
E. Upon consummation of the transactions contemplated
herein; FS Financial will be a wholly owned subsidiary off First
Security Corporation ("FS Corp.").
F. FS Financial is in the process of acquiring the
assets and liabilities of Murray First Thrift & Loan Company
("MPT"} pursuant to that certain Purchase and Assumotion Agreement
between FS Financial, FS Corp., MFT, et al.f dated ^ycJ^^r
/3 ,
1982 (the "MFT Agreement").
G. In connection with and contingent upon its
acquisition of MFT, FS Financial desires also to acquire the
assets of Capitol, and Capitol is willing to sell its assets to
FS Financial, on the terms and conditions set forth below.
NOW, THEREFORE, the parties hereto agree as follows:
1. Purchase of Assets. Capitol hereby agrees to sell
to FS Financial, and FS Financial hereby agrees to purchase from
Capitol, all of the assets of Capitol as shown on the audited
balance sheet of Capitol dated June 30, 1982, attached hereto as
Exhibit "A" and made a part hereof by this reference, subject to
adjustment-,^ provided in Paragraph 3 below. Included among the
assets sold* shall be all'leases, insurance policies and other
contract rights, and all books of account, customer records and
documents of every nature relating to the business of Capitol

being acquired Jby FS .Financial. Not included among the assets
sold shall be the corporate documents, books and records which
relate to the overall organization and- continuing financial
affairs of Capitol and only those additional specific items of
tangible and intangible personal property identified on Exhibit
m n
B , attached hereto and made a part hereof -by this reference, and
Capitolfs leasehold interest in the premises currently occupied by
it in the Continental Bank Building in Salt Lake City, Utah*
2. Consideration, As consideration for the purchase
of the assets of Capitol, except as limited in the following
sentence, FS Financial agrees to assume all of the liabilities of
Capitol set forth on the balance sheet attached hereto as Exhibit
"A," as adjusted pursuant to Paragraph 3 below, and also all
liabilities of Capitol which may be asserted after the Closing
Date which relate 'to the collection of any of the receivables of
Capitol acquired by FS Financial and which were incurred in the
normal course of business prior to the Closing Date, and to
indemnify and hold Capitol harmless therefrom. Not included among
the liabilities assumed shall be any liabilities of Capitol not
eapressly disclosed on .said balance .sheet .(other _than those
incurred in the normal course of business prior to Closing which
relate to the collection of receivables) ,'any liabilities arising
out of or in connection with Capitol's leasehold interest in its
premises in the Continental Bank Building, and any accrued but
unpaid wages, employment taxes, employee benefit plan liabilities,
net income, franchise, sales, use, property and any other state or
Federal tax liabilities, including any tax liabilities arising as
a result of* this transaction, and Capitol agrees to indemnify and
hold FS Financial harmless therefrom.
As further consideration, subject to adjustment as
provided in Paragraph 3 below, FS Financial agrees to pay Capitol
the sum of One Million Three Hundred Seventy-Nine Thousand Nine
Hundred Eleven and 78/100 Dollars ($1,379,911.78) cash, payable as
follows:
(a) Two Hundred Thousand Dollars ($200,000.00) at
the Closing (hereinafter defined);
N^.fi / c77 7 77. Vy
(b) The balance of One Million One Hundred
Seventy-Nfne-Thousand-Nirne^HundreQ'^Bleven and ~787100
Dol-lar-s—(^-trl^STSirnS)-sTfall be paid in a lump sum on
the third anniversary of the Closing Date;
(c) The principal amount of the deferred portion of
the purchase price shall earn interest at the rate of ten
percent (10.0%) per annum and accrued interest shall be

-2-
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paid irv-twelve (12) quarterly installments beginning
three (3) months after the Closing Date.
For purposes of arriving at the above purchase price, the assets
of Capitol were valued at 'their book value and the cash portion
of the purchase price was determined to be equal to the book net
worth of CaDitol as shown on the balance sheet attached hereto as
Exhibit "A".
At the end of the three (3) year period of deferral and
prior to the payment of the principal amount of the deferred
portion of the purchase price, the xjeaj^ estate and receivables
(of Capitol acquired by FS Financial shall be valued in the manner
[set foYtirnbeiow^ In the event that (i) the aggregate value ot~"the
Lj^eal estate iT'les's^Fhan Its P O O * value as or tne~"Closinq Date
;
and/or (ii) the actual and anticipated losses orT the"tol2Fction of
^trTF"^LmQunt of the receivables as of the Closing Date exceecTythe
preserve for losses as"~or tfte Closing Date, the principal amount
*ot tne ceierreti portion of the purchase price shall De~~acTjIisted
taownwa^LJLn an equivalent amount. Further, the principal amount
of the deferred portion of the purchase price shall also be
adjusted downward in the amount of any-liabilities of Capitol
•relating to the collection of receivables which were incurred
in the normal course of business prior to Closing but were' not
disclosed on Capitol's balance sheet at Closing and which were
i^ssumed by FS Financial hereunder, yhp aggregate of_such downward
adjustments of the principal amount of the deferred por
«the purchase price shall in no event exceed une Million Vu±±
($lr Q00f 0 0 0'. OOJ^ NoTwitnstanding any such downward adjustments
"ot tne principal amount of the deferred portion- of the purchase
price, there shall be no adjustment of the amount of interest paid
by FS Financial under Paragraph 2(c) hereof during the three (3)
year period.
f
Actual ana, anticipated losses on receivables shall
'include losses on those receivables already written off by FS
Financial in accordance with standard financial practice and FS
Financial's actual experience and also one hundred percent
(100.0%) of .those receivables classified either as a "loss" or
as "doubtful" by the Department of Financial Institutions in its
ost recent examination of FS Financial, provided one has been
onducted within three 1(3) months prior to the end of the three
^3) year period; provided, further, if no such examination has
£een conducted within £he final three (3) months, the parties
shall call M for one. Out-of-pocket costs of collection incurred
liy FS Financial with respect to any such receivables (other than
\iith respect to any liabilities relating to the collection of
receivables which have been assumed by FS Financial hereunder),
I
/
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including withoujt-limitation reasonable attorney's fees, shall be
added to the principal amount of such receivables in determining
K the amount of loss suffered thereon. Any such receivables which
are written off by FS Financial or which are classified AS a
•loss" or as •doubtful" for purposes of this paragraph shall be
reassigned to Capitol by FS Financial at the end of the three (3)
year period.
Any remaining unsold real estate at the end of the three
(3) year period shall be valued by M.A.I, appraisal as of that •
time. To the extent any real estate has been sold during the
three. (3) year period, it shall be valued at its contract sales
price. In both cases, the value of the .real estate shall be
reduced by the costs of sale and preparation for sale, such as
necessary fix-up expenses, if any, incurred by FS Financial.
In order to facilitate the above valuations, FS Financial
shall keep its books in such a way that the receivables and real
estate acquired from Capitol can be separately identified at all
/ times during the three (3) year period.
~"3."-Thanees p r j > Q r to Closingr.rTo ^thejextent. there are
chances in the assets, liabilities and net worth of Capitol
between June 30, 1982, and the Closing Date, which changes are a
result of transactions entered into in the ordinary course of
business, it is understood and agreed by the parties that those
assets being sold by Capitol to FS Financial shall be the assets
of Capitol, as defined herein, as of the Closing Date, and that
those liabilities being assumed by FS Financial shall be the
liabilities of Capitol, as defined herein, as of the Closing
Date, Further, the principal amount of the deferred portion of
the purchase price shall be adjusted up or down, as the case may
be, in an amount equal to the change'in the book net worth of
Capitol between June 30, 1982, and the Closing Date. For this
purpose, Capitol shall prepare a balance sheet of those of its
assets and liabilities as of the Closing Date which are included
in the sale, complete with detailed schedules identifying
individual assets and liabilities and also any off-balance sheet
items included in the sale. At the Closing, the parties shall
execute an appropriate amendment to this Agreement specifying the
principal amount of the deferred portion of the purchase price as
adjusted in accordance with the provisions of this paragraph.
Capitol hereby represents and warrants that the balance
i h ! ^

*M»?rh^

hPrMr^ ^

FYhihil*

»ft*

1 * t.r.no^,c.ojnpjUB±e^aildL'^s

^

^accujiai;?! in every m a t e r i a l r e s p e c t as of June 30, 1982, and t h a t
^during t h e p e r i o d b e g i n n i n g June 3D, 1982, and ending on the d a t e
of t h i s Agreement t h e r e have been no m a t e r i a l changes in the

assets and liabilities of Capitol other than as a result of
transactions entered into in the ordinary course of business,
Capitol hereby covenants and agrees that during the period
beginning with the date of this Agreement and ending on the
Closing Date, it shall not enter into any transactions other than
in the regular.course of business. .Capitol further represents and
warrants that the balance sheet to be prepared by it as of the
Closing Date will be true, complete and accurate in every material
respect as of the Closing.Date.
Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, it shall
be a condition precedent to the obligation of FS Financial to "
jrlose tnis transaction that there have been nffTirarterial changes in
The assets or liabilities of Capitol between June 3U, iy82, and
the Closing Date, and that the representations, warranties and
covenants of Capitol contained in this Paragraph shall not have
been breached in any material respect.
4. Payment of Indemnity. The amount of any payment made
by FS Financial or Capitol to a third party for which FS Financial
or Capitol is entitled to indemnification hereunder shall accrue
ihterest'"atr::the~rate of ten "percent"(10.0%). per~annum from the
date of payment by FS Financial or Capitol to said third party
through the date of reimbursement by the indemnifying party. If
FS Financial is the party entitled to indemnification, it may
require payment immediately or, at its option, it may set ofr the
principal and interest portions of the amount of such indemnity
against the payments otherwise due Capitol under Subparagraphs
2"(b) and 2 (c) ,~ respectively, as adjusted pursuant to Paragraph 3,
above. If Capitol is the party entitled to indemnification, it
may require payment immediately or, at its option,' it may add the
principal and interest portions of the amount of such indemnity to
the payments otherwise due it under Subparagraphs 2(b) and 2(c),
respectively, as adjusted pursuant to Paragraph 3, above.
5. Personnel. It is contemplated that FS Financial will
employ all of the current personnel of Capitol in FS Financial's
operation. In particular, it is of the essence to. this
transaction that Capitol's president and executive vice president,
Richard A. Christenson and Bruce L. Hoesser, respectively, become
officers in FS Financial. However, the terms of any such
employment arrangement shall be subject to good faith negotiations
between the parties and no assurances are given in this Agreement
as to what the particulars of such employment arrangements can or
will be. It is understood, however, that all employee benefits or
claims, whether of a pension, health or other nature, which have
accrued or which arise out of events prior to the Closing Date,
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shall be and remain the sole liability of Capitol, and Capitol
agrees to indemnify and hold FS Financial harmless therefrom.
6. Noncompetition. During such time as Christenson and
Hoesser are employed by FS Financial, Christenson and Moesser
covenant and agree, each for himself, that he will not engage,
directly or Indirectly, whether as sole proprietor, pitrTrrer,
shareholder, ofiicer, director, employee or consultant, in any
V ^ I ^ c t ^ v i t y * n t ^ indTTs~trial loan, thrTft and loan or banking
industry in theHState oiLUtah except as an o m c e r ana employee of
FS Financial. It is understood that Christenson, Hoesser, Sally
Taylor, and Meriyn Hanks are officers and/or trustees of and will
continue to have an ownership and participation in Franklin
Financial, Cape Trust, the corporate entity surviving Capitol
Thrift and Loan (which is contemplated to be named "The Capitol
Company*1), Capitol Leasing, Seahurst, and affiliated companies,
and that they will be allowed to wind down and preserve the value
of these assets without being in violation of the terms of this
Agreement,
If at any time Christenson or Hoesser leave the employ of
FS-Financial,: for • any reason, _Christensqn_and_Hoesser covenant and
agree, each for himself,"that he "will not dfvuige or make use of
any trade secrets, customer information or other confidential
knowhow or information gained by him as a result of his employment
by FS Financial nor will he solicit other persons to leave their
employ with FS Financial, other than Christenson's personal
secretary, Sally Taylor. _ Also, for—one ID—y.e_ar after leaving the
emolov of_FS Financial, Christenson agrees not to engage in any
^activity in direct competition with F"§ financial in gKJ^frrirf-t and
J\ loan industry.
"
" """"

vv
'L

F u r t h e r , C a p i t o l agrees to change i t s name as of the
Closing Date and to t r a n s f e r to FS Financial at the Closing a l l
r i g h t s to the use of i t s name, but reserving tq^-ttse-Lf^the right
to use any other name which includes the name ^ a p i t c ^ l ^ b u t not
the words "Thrift and Loan" or any combination th-ereodS^^^- &C
7. Government Approvals. I t s h a l l be a condition
precedent to the o b l i g a t i o n of FS Financial to close t h i s
t r a n s a c t i o n t h a t FS Corp s h a l l have received the prior approval
of the Federal Reserve Board to acquire the shares of tS Financial
in connection with FS F i n a n c i a l ' s a c q u i s i t i o n of the assets and
l i a b i l i t i e s of C a p i t o l and HFT as s e t forth herein and in the HFT
Agreement.., I t s h a l l be a further condition precedent hereto t h a t
the Utah Department of F i n a n c i a l I n s t i t u t i o n s shall have given i t s
approval to t h i s t r a n s a c t i o n , and t h a t there be no other required
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regulatory approval or consent which has not been obtained,
shall be a further condition precedent hereto tihat the MPT
Agreement be consummated in accordance with its Serins.
8. Closing. The closing of this transaction (the
"Closing- or "Closing Date") shall take place at t W same time and
place and simultaneously with the closing of the HFT Agreement,
but in no event later than six (6) months after the\date of this
Agreement. _At the Closing f Capitol shall transfer ;title to those
Of. its assets being S Q I Q to JbS^TtnSn^lal by"cMt claim oeedT^bill
ojTjsale, or otner appropriate instrument of transfer, ana
Financial snail assumg_aJJ. of the liabilities ot Capitol \
>as agreed to assume hereunder by an appropriate assumption ~~
ag££^m¥i^ At the Closing, FS FinanciaiTTfiaTIX^STsonpay^to Capitol
"the pcrtXon of the purchase price payable under Paragraph 2(a)
hereof, and the parties shall execute an appropriate amendment to
this Agreement to specify the exact Closing Date and the principal
amount of the deferred portion of the purchase price payable under
Paragraph 2(b) hereof, as adjusted at the Closing pursuant to
Paragraph 3 hereof.

u
v
l

9. , Guaranty. Christenson hereby" ouarantP«g fha* *h*
representations and warranties made by Capitol herein are true,
complete^and ^rrurxtf* m pvery material respect as of tfif ^ ^ -

for whj^ch jthev are made r and hereby guarantees the performance by
Capitol^of i t s o b l i g a t i o n of indemnity with resppr^ *-n iJL^w^^^t-?r^
and o b l i g a t i o n s of C a p i t o l not assumed by FS Financial hprpunnpr^
u'ch Guaranties to De c o n t i n u i n g , absolute, unconditional and
/primary.
~
"~
10. Press R e l e a s e s . All p a r t i e s agree that no press
r e l e a s e or other s t a t e m e n t , whether written or verbal, s h a l l be
made or given to any r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the news media with respect
to t h i s t r a n s a c t i o n without the express prior approval of a l l
other p a r t i e s .
1 1 . Corporate A u t h o r i t y . Capitol represents and
warrants t h a t i t i s a duly organized, validly existing corporation
in good standing under the laws of the State of Utah; that i t is
in f u l l compliance with a l l laws, regulations, orders and other
governmental r u l i n g s which r e g u l a t e or purport to regulate
C a p i t o l ' s operation as an i n d u s t r i a l loan corporation in the State
of Utah; t h a t i t has f u l l corporate power and authority to
execute, d e l i v e r and c a r r y out the provisions of t h i s Agreement,
including .the necessary consent of i t s shareholders; and that when
so execute'3 and d e l i v e r e d t h i s Agreement s h a l l constitute a legal,
v a l i d and binding o b l i g a t i o n of Capitol, enforceable against i t in
accordance with i t s t e r m s . FS Financial represents and warrants
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good

accordance with its terms. The representations and warranties
mace in this paragraph shall be deemed made as of the date hereof
and again at the Closing." Capitol and FS Financial agree to
provide each other at the Closing with certified copies of Board
of Directors and shareholder resolutions authorizing this
transaction.
1

12. Survival. The parties understand and agree that all
representations and warranties made herein are true and effective
l/j both when made and as of the Closing, and that all such
representations and warranties shall survive the Closing.
13. Notice. Any notice or other communication to any
party under this Agreement shall be in writing and shall be deemed
,,to have been given on the dateon which such notice is either hand
delivered to the party • to -whom such-notice is directed or is*
tA
deposited in the United States mail as a certified or registered
' letter, postage prepaid, return receipt requested, properly
addressed to such party at the address specified below:
If to FS Financial, at:
First Security Financial
P. 0. Box 30006
Salt Lake City, Utah 84130
Attn: Treasurer
If to Capitol, at:
c/o Richard A. Christenson
2356 Dailin Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
If to Christenson, at:
c/o First Security Financial
135 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

With a copy to:
Richard A. Christenson
2356 Dallin Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
If to Moesser, at:
c/o First'Security Financial
135 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
With a copy to:
Bruce L. Moesser
2467 East 3750 South
Salt Lake City, Utah

84109

Any such .address may be changed by giving notice thereof to the
other parties in accordance vith the above urocedure.
14. Binding Effect. This Agreement snail inure to the
benefit of and be binding upon the parties a>nd their respective,
legal representatives, heirs, successors and assigns.
V^

15. Counterpart Originals. For the convenience of the
parties f this Agreement shall be executed in four (4) counterpart
originals, which taken together<shall constitute a single agreement.
16

\S

- Headings. The headings of the Paragraphs herein have
been inserted for ease of reference only and shall not control or
affect the meaning or interpretation of any of the terms and
provisions hereof.

%/

17. Governing Lav. . This Agreement is entered into under
and shall be governed by the laws of the State of Utah.

]/

18. Further Action. The parties hereby agree to execute
and deliver such additional documents and to take such further
action as may become necessary or desirable to fully carry out the
provisions and intent of this Agreement.

/
19. Severability. In the event one or more of the
W p r o v i s i o n s contained in this Agreement shall for any reason be held
invalid, illegal or unenforceable in any respect, such invalidity,
illegality'or unenforceability shall not affect the validity,
legality and enforceability of any other provision hereof, and this
Agreement shall be construed as if such invalid, illegal or
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unenforceable provision had never been contained herein, provided
that the Agreement as so modified preserves the basic intent of the
parties.
Construction,

As used herein,

21. Prior Agreements Superseded, This Agreement supersedes
any prior understandings or agreements among the parties, whether
written or verbal, respecting the within subject matter, and contains
the entire understanding of the parties with respect thereto.
22. Enforcement. In the event of a dispute among the
parties arising under this Agreement, the party or parties prevailing in such dispute shall be entitled to collect their costs from
the other parties, including without limitation court costs and
reasonable attorney's fees.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this
Agreement on the date hereinabove first written.
FIRST SECURITY FINANCIAL

•^<2^d.

By

Elmer D. Tucker
Vice President
CAPITOL THRIFT AND LOAN COMPANY
B

Y L/^-<-

Richard A. Christenson,
President

^f^'-r/ti
Richard .A. Christenson,
Individually

Bruce L. Moesser,
Individually
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